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Abstract 
 
In recent years legal challenges to charitable bequests by testators’ family members have 
become more common in Australia.  Many charities faced with the prospect of a disputed 
bequest have been reluctant to pursue the matter in the courts. A review of leading reported 
cases involving charitable bequests in wills reveals that the courts are vigorous in upholding 
proper family provision as against charitable bequests, portraying this provision as based on 
moral obligation.  Proper provision for family and other dependants is supported by both 
legislation and the courts on public policy grounds. This concept is confined to Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, and to a lesser extent England, which are the only countries with 
comprehensive family provision legislation. The generational transfer of wealth by baby-
boomers over the coming decades provides a scenario for increasing conflict between 
families and charities over bequests. How should this be balanced with the notion of 
testamentary freedom?   
 
This working paper is part of a series of research projects on bequests and planned 
giving funded by the E F and S L Gluyas Trust and the Edward Corbould Charitable 
Trust under the management of the Perpetual Trustees Company.  Many issues require 
further investigation, including practical considerations for charities in pursuing 
bequests in wills, and a further report will be forthcoming from CPNS on this topic. 
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GLOSSARY 
Administration of an estate – term used for the work of the executor in carrying out the 
terms of a will 
Beneficiary – person or organisation benefiting under a will  
Bequest – gift of an identifiable asset (not money) to person/organisation in will.  However, 
the terms bequest and legacy are often used interchangeably in general usage 
Civil law jurisdiction – a jurisdiction using European civil law as its basic legal system 
Codicil – a change or addition to an existing will 
Common law jurisdiction - a jurisdiction using English common law as its basic legal system 
(e.g. Australia, New Zealand, England and Wales, Canada (except for Quebec), and the 
United States (except for Louisiana)  
Contingent bequest – gift of an asset dependent upon an event occurring 
Curtesy – provision for a widower (no longer applies) 
Discretionary jurisdiction – a legal jurisdiction which allows judges to make the decisions 
on essential matters based on the particular facts of a case 
Dower – provision for a widow (no longer applies) 
Escheat – reversion of land to the main lord (or the Crown) in the absence of any heirs. 
Estate – the totality of the property which the deceased owned or had some interest at the 
time of death 
Estates in fee simple or in fee tail – legal terms denoting real estate 
Equity – a part of the English law system, based on principles of fairness, originally separate 
from common law, but now part of the overall system used in Australia and in other common 
law countries 
Executor (m)/executrix (f) – a person appointed by a will-maker to ensure that the intentions 
in a will are carried out. It is no longer essential to differentiate these terms on the basis of 
gender.  However, judges still often do so in judgements. 
Family provision – term used in Australia and New Zealand for provision made for family 
members in a will  
Family protection – term used in New Zealand for family provision; alternate term used is 
testator’s family maintenance 
Forced share – a fixed share of an estate left to a family member 
Forfeiture – the loss of the right to an inheritance by egregious conduct e.g. killing the 
testator 
Inter vivos – while alive 
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Intestate – Dying without leaving a will, or leaving an invalid will, so that the property of the 
estate passes by the laws of succession rather than by the direction of the deceased 
Legacy – a gift of money to a person/organisation in will 
Life interest – a lifetime gift, such as giving someone the right to live in a property until that 
person’s death. On the death of the person given the life interest, the asset or capital is 
distributed according to the will. 
Mesne lord – a holder of land in the feudal system who was an intermediate lord, being both 
landlord to inferior landholders and tenant of a superior lord. 
Mortmain – literally ‘dead hand’; originally referred to act of parliament which sought to 
prevent the bequest of land and buildings to the Church; in later succession law referred to 
acts of parliament which prevented bequests to charity, originally of land and buildings, and 
later, of money.  Mortmain never applied in Australian law, and no longer applies in English 
law. 
Mutual wills – wills which leave assets to each person in the same way (commonly applies 
between spouses) 
Notional estate – assets which are returned to the estate of the deceased after death 
because they should not have been disposed of before death.  This increases the estate for 
distribution (currently applies only in New South Wales) 
Patrimony – traditionally, inheritance from a father’s estate; in modern terms, the total 
inheritance in an estate 
Pecuniary legacy – fixed sum of money expressed as a gift in a will 
Personalty – personal property (cf. realty) 
Probate – the granting of the right to administer a will 
Residuary legacy – remainder of your (money) estate left as a legacy after bequests and 
specific legacies have been distributed and all debts cleared  
Residue of estate – possessions, property and money remaining after all debts and gifts are 
distributed in accordance with the will 
Reversionary legacy – a legacy consisting of the assets or money left after a life interest has 
been fulfilled. 
Specific bequest – the gift of an identifiable asset such as jewellery or furniture  
Succession law– the law relating to wills and estates 
Testate – dying having made a will 
Testamentary – referring to a will 
Testation - the statements of intent in a will 
Testator (m) /testatrix (f) – person who makes a will.  It is no longer essential to differentiate 
these terms on the basis of gender.  However, judges still often do so in judgements. 
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Testator’s family maintenance – alternate (older) term for family provision 
Will – a legal document expressing the intentions of a person for the distribution of their 
assets after death 
Will-maker – a plain English term now sometimes used instead of testator or testatrix 
   Working Paper 42   iv
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the interaction between family provision law and the 
freedom of a testator to leave a bequest to charity in a will. That the clearly stated 
philanthropic intentions of a testator should be overturned in favour of family members or 
other claimants is currently a contentious issue in family provision jurisdictions. The original 
purpose of family provision law was to enforce the proper maintenance and support of a 
testator’s spouse and children.  Family provision laws were introduced into Australia from 
New Zealand, and spread to Canada and the UK.  No other jurisdictions have such laws. In 
the 108 years since their introduction in New Zealand, family provision laws have had their 
influence extended through judicial interpretation and active promotion of the priority of family 
claims on a testator’s estate as part of public policy. Testamentary freedom, although never 
completely dominant in English law, is now seriously challenged in Australia. 
 
A review of major reported cases shows that charities have been deprived of bequests, or 
had bequests substantially reduced, as a result of the primacy of family claims. However, 
family provision disputes do not always result in judicial decision as they are often settled  
through a mediation process. In more recent years, as the concept of ‘family’ has been 
extended to include de facto partners, same sex partners, wider family, and various 
dependants not envisaged by the framers of the original legislation, the primacy of family 
claims has become even more difficult for charities to overcome.  At the same time, charities 
are seeking to strategically position themselves to benefit from the expected intergenerational 
wealth transfer from the baby boomer generation. Bequests from this source are needed to 
resource the increasing capital requirements required by charity as the welfare system is 
wound back due to demographic and fiscal pressures.  
 
The paper first briefly examines the historical development of inheritance law in both civil and 
common law jurisdictions to provide a context for the subsequent discussion. Over the 
centuries the attitude of the state or crown to charities receiving bequests has varied widely, 
often being restricted in favour of dependants. The paper then considers the contest between 
charitable bequests in wills and family provision law in Australia and New Zealand. The 
historical tendency has been for the legal position to move from testamentary freedom to 
testamentary duty to family and dependants, with the position currently firmly entrenched in 
not only testamentary duty, but also moral duty to a wide range of dependants.  The paper 
then turns to current law reform proposals, and considers how these might shift the balance 
between these parties. 
 
This working paper is part of a series of research projects on bequests and planned 
giving funded by the E F and S L Gluyas Trust and the Edward Corbould Charitable 
Trust under the management of the Perpetual Trustees Company.  Many issues require 
further investigation, including practical considerations for charities in pursuing 
bequests in wills, and a further report will be forthcoming from CPNS on this topic. 
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PROVIDING FOR THE FAMILY AFTER DEATH 
 
It seems to be an accepted norm in most cultures that inheritance should be linked to blood 
ties. In most legal systems, the right to inherit is limited either by relationship or by amount.   
Either the group of related persons on whom inheritance may devolve is limited, as in 
common law systems, or the amount any one person may receive from inheritance is limited, 
as is the case in civil law systems. 
 
Civil law jurisdictions1 have traditionally favoured the forced share approach to testamentary 
dispositions, with spouses and children entitled to definite shares of an estate by statute, or 
by custom. This Roman law concept is still seen today in many jurisdictions, including in most 
European and South American countries,2 in Japan, Scotland, and South Africa, as well as in 
a modified form in Quebec, Canada and in Louisiana, USA, and to a partial extent, in Ireland. 
The relevant Roman law principles are those of terce (the right of a surviving spouse to a life 
interest in one-third of the realty of the estate); jus relictae (the right of a surviving spouse to 
one-half of the moveable property of a deceased spouse if there are no children, or to one-
third if there are children); and legitim (the right of children to one third of the parent’s 
moveables if there is a surviving parent and to one-half if there are no surviving parents, all to 
be shared equally). In civil law jurisdictions, these were often expressed in the law of dower.   
 
In modern civil law terms, dower has been abolished. In Quebec, for example, the term used 
now is ‘family patrimony’, and a surviving spouse is entitled to half the value of the divisible 
patrimony. The remaining half is distributed according to the will, or the intestacy rules of the 
Code Civil du Quebec.3 In Scotland, the terms now used are ‘prior rights’ and ‘legal rights’ to 
property.4 Prior rights only apply in the case of intestacy, and allocate specific amounts to a 
spouse or children. There are also ‘legal rights’ to moveable property applicable in intestacy.  
Legal rights can also apply if there is a will, but the beneficiary has to choose between the 
legal rights and the amount left in the will. In Japan, there is a statutory division of the estate 
of half to a spouse and half to all lineal descendants. If there are no lineal descendants, then 
the statutory division is two-thirds to a spouse and one-third to any lineal ascendants.  \If 
there are no descendants or ascendants, then the division is three-quarters to a spouse and 
one-quarter to living brothers and sisters. There is no allowance for testamentary 
independence unless a specific will is made.5
 
The situation in the US is mixed, and confusing. The Uniform Probate Code6 has been 
adopted in 16 states of the US,7 although in various Revisions. Some states have adopted 
the Code in part in their legislation, but most have their own legislation on provision by 
elective forced shares.8  Louisiana, still retaining a civil law system, has a forced share, the 
legitime, for children under 23, or who are mentally infirm or otherwise disabled from 
inheritance.9 In the Uniform Probate Code, in intestate succession a spouse is entitled to all 
                                                 
1 Civil law jurisdictions are based on Roman law and are found in Europe and those parts of the world 
conquered, settled or influenced by European powers.  These jurisdictions are to be compared with 
common law jurisdictions, based on English law, which are found in those parts of the world conquered, 
settled or influenced by Britain. Some countries, or parts of countries, have mixed systems because of 
their history (e.g. South Africa, Scotland, Ireland, Quebec, Louisiana) or by choice (e.g. Japan). 
2 M. B. Leslie, ‘The Myth of Testamentary Freedom’ (1996) 38 Ariz. L Rev 235 at 270. 
3 C.C.Q., L.Q., 1991, chapter 64, arts. 414-426.   
4 Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 sections 8 and 9 read with The Prior Rights of Surviving Spouse 
(Scotland) Order 2005. 
5Ministry of Finance Japan (2006) Comprehensive Handbook of Japanese Taxes, Chapter IV, 
Inheritance and Gift Tax. 
6 Original version 1969, with Revisions in 1989 and 1990. 
7Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah. 
8Elective share statutes allow the surviving spouse to take either an elective (forced) share of the estate, 
or to take whatever share they have been left in the will.  See generally: L. Waggoner, ‘Spousal Rights 
in our Multiple Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform Probate Code’ (1992) 26 (4) Real Property, 
Probate and Trust Journal 683; R. Chester, ‘Should American children be protected against 
disinheritance?’ (1997) 32(3) Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 405. 
9 Louisiana Civil Code (Ann.) Articles 1493, 1494.  See generally: R. D. Madoff, C. R. Tenney and M. A. 
Hall, Practical Guide to Estate Planning, 2006 edition, chapter 6, 6-15. 
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the deceased’s estate unless there are surviving parents or descendants not also the 
descendants of the spouse.10 In effect, this disinherits the children of the marriage. Where 
there is a will, the Code provides for an elective share amount for a surviving spouse of 
between 3% and 50% of the estate depending on the length of the marriage.11 This variable 
forced share applies regardless of the terms of the will. 
 
The modern forced share approach can be contrasted with that of statutes in a small group of 
common law countries which give a wide discretion to the Courts to divide an estate under 
dispute, commonly referred to as family or dependants’ provision. Family provision legislation 
confers rights on applicants, typically spouses, de facto spouses, children (including adopted 
and stepchildren), grandchildren and parents, to apply to the court to overturn bequests in 
wills which do not adequately provide for the maintenance and support of the applicants. This 
is clearly an interference with testamentary freedom, and is supported by both legislation and 
the courts on public policy grounds. The notion of testamentary freedom as we understand it 
today was a construct of the nineteenth century, an offshoot of the style of English laissez-
faire liberalism fashionable at the time. However, it was recognised late in the nineteenth 
century that testamentary freedom of this type allowed some testators to ignore their 
responsibilities to close family, particularly spouses and children. This was regarded as 
particularly a problem in the then newly developing, but very wealthy, dominions of Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada, and was fanned by an indignant press which reported several 
notorious cases of wealthy men leaving their widows and children unprovided for in their 
estates.12  
 
The legislation introduced into Australian states’ law was based on innovative New Zealand 
legislation, the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900, which attracted much attention in the 
common law world at the time and was later copied for both testate and intestate situations in 
English law, and the provinces of Canada (except Quebec). The New Zealand legislation of 
1900 had its genesis in an 1877 Act which enabled illegitimate children under 14 to apply for 
maintenance out of the estate of deceased parents,13 the Destitute Persons Act 1894 (NZ),14 
and in the Native Land Court Act 1894 (NZ) which provided that Maori applicants were to be 
left with ‘sufficient land for their maintenance’ after claims alienating Maori land reserves to 
white settlers.15 It is also possible that the introduction of the legislation was intimately 
connected with New Zealand’s avant garde approach to social welfare, with old age pensions 
being introduced in New Zealand in 1898, and widows’ pensions in 1911.16 It could be argued 
that these state pensions encouraged even wealthy testators to leave their estates away from 
their spouses, especially wives.   
 
The first incarnation of the legislation was in 1896, when a Bill on the Limitations of 
Disposition by Will was introduced into the New Zealand legislature by Sir Robert Stout, later 
Chief Justice of New Zealand. This Bill proposed a type of civil law forced share arrangement 
by which only one third of a testator’s estate could be disposed of by will if he left a wife and 
                                                 
10 Article II, Part 2, 2-102 
11 Article II, Part 2, 2-202. 
12 J. Mackintosh, ‘Limitations on Free Testamentary Disposition in the British Empire’ (1930) 12(1) 
Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law (3rd Series) 13, 13. 
13 B. J. Cameron, ‘Family ‘Protection’, An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand 1966 available at 
www.teara.govt.nz/F/FamilyProtection/FamilyProtection/en,  viewed 11 October 2007.  The name of this 
Act is not stated. 
14 This Act provided that in the case of intestacy, a widow was to receive one-third of any estate, and 
the children equal shares of one third of the estate. 
15 Section 131(2).  See Waitangi Tribunal, The Te Roroa Report 1992, Te Roroa Claim, 03 Nga Whenua 
Rahui (Reserves), 3.1 Official Attitudes and Policies at www.waitangi–tribunal.govt.nz/reports/, 
accessed on 11 October 2007.  No doubt the Maori claimants would not have seen this as appropriate.  
As the Report states: “By the time of the Native Land Court Act 1894 the 50 acre guideline (the original 
amount of land set aside for each Maori claimant)] had been watered down to a requirement that ‘the 
owners have sufficient land left for their maintenance”.  It was, of course, entirely up to the Government 
Officials to decide how much land would be “sufficient”.’ This Act also provided in section 46 that: ‘If a 
native leaves children without enough land to maintain then, his will disposing of his land otherwise is 
invalid’.  
16 Ann Beaglehole, Benefiting Women, Department of Internal Affairs, New Zealand., accessed on 17 
July 2008 at www.msd.govt.nz/documents/publications/msd/journal/issue03/spj3-benefiting -women.doc
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children, and one half if he left only children. This Bill was not approved because of its too 
obvious interference with testamentary freedom. A variation introduced in 1897 increased the 
amount to be disposed by will to one half in all cases, but was also unsuccessful. In 1898, the 
idea of forced shares was abandoned, and the first draft of totally discretionary testator’s 
family maintenance legislation was introduced, with a second draft Bill being introduced in 
1900. This latter Bill became the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900 (NZ).17
 
This original New Zealand legislation of 1900 was replaced by the Testator’s Family 
Maintenance Act 1906, which extended the time period for applications from six months to 
twelve months from the date of probate, and allowed for provision to be made in the form of 
either lump sums or periodical payments.18 This Act was in turn repealed, and replaced by 
the Family Protection Act 1908.19 Meanwhile, the idea of family provision quickly spread 
throughout Australia, and eventually to Canada and the UK.20
 
Current legislation on family provision in Australia varies from state to state,21 and there are 
variations in wording in the legislation. Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria refer to ‘proper 
maintenance and support’.22 New South Wales, South Australia, the Northern Territory and 
the Australian Capital Territory use the term ‘proper maintenance, education and 
advancement in life’,23 while Western Australian legislation has the term ‘proper maintenance, 
support, education or advancement in life’.24 Despite these differences, the High Court has 
encouraged uniformity of interpretation in its decisions.25 Whilst true uniformity of 
interpretation cannot be guaranteed in the cases, since each will turn on its facts to some 
                                                 
17 See generally J. Dainow, ‘Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada’ (1938) 36(7) 
Michigan L Rev 1107, 1108-1110. The relevant provision of the 1900 Act was: 
Should any person die leaving a will, and without making therein adequate provision for the proper 
maintenance and support of his or her wife, husband, or children, the Court may, at its discretion, on 
application by or on behalf of the said wife, husband, or children, order that such provision as the said 
Court shall seem fit shall be made out of the estate of the said deceased person for such wife, husband or 
children: Provided that the Court may attach such conditions to the order made as it shall think fit, or may 
refuse to make an order in favour of any person whose character or conduct is such as in the opinion of the 
Court to disentitle him or her to the benefit of an order under this section. 
18 See generally: J. Christie, ‘Testators’ Family Maintenance in New Zealand’ (1918) 18(2) Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law (New Series) 216-219. 
19 The testators’ family maintenance provisions were contained in Part II of the Family Protection Act 
1908 (NZ), particularly at s 33.  This latter Act was repealed by the current legislation, the Family 
Protection Act 1955: see section 16(1) of the 1955 Act and the Schedule to that Act. 
20 The first jurisdiction to copy the New Zealand legislation was Victoria in the Widows and Young 
Children Maintenance Act 1906, and then Tasmania in the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912, 
Queensland in the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1914, Victoria (consolidating) in the 
Administration and Probate Act 1915, sections 108-117, New South Wales in the Testator’s 
Maintenance and Guardianship of Infants Act 1916, South Australia in the Testator’s Family 
Maintenance Act 1918, Western Australia in the Guardianship of Infants Act 1920 section 11, British 
Columbia in the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act (R.S.B.C. 1924 c.256), the Australian Capital 
Territory in the Administration and Probate Ordinance 1929, Part VII, the Northern Territory in the 
Testator’s Family Maintenance Order 1929, and England in the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938.  
The latter act differed from the other legislation in that the discretion allowed to the Court was much 
more restricted in monetary terms, though the statute required that the Court could intervene when the 
will did not make ‘reasonable provision’ for the maintenance of dependants. 
21 Succession Act 2006 (NSW) section 59(2); previously, Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) sections 7, 
8, and 9(2); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) section 91; Succession Act 1981 (Qld) section 
41; Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) section 7(1); Inheritance (Family and Dependants 
Provision) Act 1972 (WA) section 6(1).Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas) section 3(1); 
Family Provision Act 1970 (NT) section 8(1); and the Family Provision Act 1969 (ACT) section 8(1).   
22 Succession Act 1981 (Qld) section 41(1); Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas) section 3(1); 
Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) section 91. 
23 Succession Act 2006 (NSW) section 59(2); previously, Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) sections 7, 
8, and 9(2); Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) section 7(1); Family Provision Act 1970 (NT) 
section 8(1); Family Provision Act 1969 (ACT) section 8(1). 
24 Inheritance (Family and Dependants Provision) Act 1972 (WA) section 6(1). 
25 In Coates v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 494, Dixon CJ made this 
clear, stating that:  ‘The legislation of the various States is all grounded on the same policy and found its 
source in New Zealand.  Refined distinctions between the Acts are to be avoided…’ (at 506-507).  In the 
same case, Fullager J, at 517, said that ‘…the searching out of nice distinctions is to be deprecated, and 
the approach which presumes uniformity of intention is the correct approach’. 
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extent, and the jurisdiction is wholly discretionary, the differences in wording have not caused 
any apparent undue confusion.  
 
However, New South Wales has a major difference in policy, having adopted the concept of 
‘notional estate’ in its legislation, and this has caused an apparent increase in the number of 
cases proceeding to court in that state. Notional estate consists of assets which are disposed 
of by a deceased in order to prevent or frustrate family provision claims of eligible persons 
after the deceased’s death, by transferring the whole or part of the deceased’s assets  to a 
third person. It is irrelevant whether or not the third person holds the property as trustee.26 
The assets must be transferred in such a way that full valuable consideration in money or 
money’s worth is not been given for the assets by the third person. There are three types of 
deferred asset transactions which are categorised as notional estate:27
 
• transactions which took effect within three years before the deceased’s death which 
were entered into with the intention of denying or limiting family provision claims of 
eligible persons; 
• transactions which took effect within one year before the deceased’s death and were 
entered into at a time when the deceased had a moral obligation to make adequate 
provision for the maintenance, education or advancement in life of any eligible 
person; or 
• transactions which took effect on or after the death of the deceased person. 
 
The concept of notional estate was adopted in New South Wales in response to a decision of 
the Privy Council in Schaefer v Schuhmann [1972] A.C. 572, on appeal from New South 
Wales. The testator was an elderly man, who had recently taken on a new housekeeper, 
Schaefer.  He promised to leave her his house, but she was otherwise unpaid for her work.  
He put this promise into his will by codicil. After he died, some six months later, one of his 
seven children applied for a family provision order. Street J in the NSW Supreme Court held 
that the house was part of the estate, and awarded provision to three of the deceased’s 
daughters. The Privy Council overturned this decision, and found that the house was 
transferred under an enforceable contract. This meant that the house was not part of the 
deceased’s estate, and could not be available for a family provision award. It was suggested 
in Schaefer that whether or not inter vivos transactions or testamentary dispositions made 
pursuant to contracts should be open to family provision applications is a matter of policy 
which should be dealt with by statute, but only New South Wales responded to that 
suggestion, presumably because the case was appealed from that state.  
 
Most family provision disputes do not reach court, either because there is compulsory 
mediation required, or because there is an informal family settlement. However, a survey of 
46 major reported cases involving bequests to charity in Australia and New Zealand (see 
Appendix A) shows that the charities involved lost the entire bequest in six of the cases, had 
their bequests substantially reduced in 35 of the cases, and prevailed against the family 
claimant in only five of the cases. Of the successful family provision claimants, 34 cases 
involved spouses and/or adult children (including step children and adopted children), four 
cases involved other family members, two cases had non-family claimants, and one case had 
a same sex claimant.  The trend to support the concept of family, and a broadening concept 
of family, in case law is clear, and is grounded in public policy in both countries. Therefore, 
although family provision legislation was not originally introduced to deprive charities of 
philanthropic bequests, this has been one of its effects over time.  
 
                                                 
26 Sections 75-77 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW); previously, section 22 of the Family Provision Act 
1982 (NSW).  Section 75 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) describes notional estate in terms of 
‘relevant property transactions’, which are transactions for which full valuable consideration has not 
been given.  See also section 80(3).  Previously, section 22(1) of the Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) 
described notional estate in terms of ‘prescribed transactions’ for which full valuable consideration had 
not been given in money or money’s worth.  The on-going review of succession law by the National 
Review Committee in Australia has completed its review of family provision law, and recommended that 
the idea of notional estate, as defined in New South Wales, should be adopted nationally. 
27 Section 80(2) of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW); previously, section 23 (b) of the Family Provision 
Act 1982 (NSW). 
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THE LEGAL HISTORY OF CHARITABLE GIVING AND BEQUESTS 
 
The forms of wealth and the timing of its transfer between generations have changed 
significantly over English legal history. Land, rather than money or chattels was the main form 
of wealth in early historical times and wealth transfers occurred on birth, adulthood, accession 
to rank, marriage and death over different periods. In English law, wealth transfers to charity 
or bequests to charity in wills have not always enjoyed the support of the monarch, legislators 
or the courts. The public policy position on the propriety of charitable giving and bequests has 
alternated over time between positive support via legislation and the normative values of 
society and absolute discouragement through restrictive legislation and societal disapproval.  
After particularly vigorous swings in policy and fashion from the 16th to the 20th centuries, the 
21st century is so far firmly in a positive phase generally for charitable giving and bequests. 
Only family provision law currently stands out against this trend.  
 
Although inheritance is, in general, linked to family blood ties either by forced shares or by the 
requirements of family provision, there are limits placed on both. In addition, the right to inherit 
within a family can be restricted by the right of bequest to non-family members or to charity. 
Bequest law has its origins in Roman law, but the reasons for its introduction in Roman law no 
longer apply,28 and some testators might regard the right of bequest to be very wide. 
However, this is not supported by legislation in family provision jurisdictions, which require 
provision for the family ahead of bequests to non-family members or to charity. 
 
The early legal history of charitable giving and bequests in English law 
 
The legal history of charitable giving and bequests in English law cannot be discussed without 
context, and that context requires a consideration of the law of mortmain.29 The term 
mortmain is an anglicisation of the French term mainmorte, and translates literally as ‘dead 
hand’. The origins of the term are disputed.30  The concept of mortmain came into English law 
from Canon Law which had adopted a Roman law prohibition on the granting of land to the 
early Christian church.  Canon law also adopted the Roman idea of a corporate community as 
the appropriate form of organisation for religious houses. Thus, religious communities were 
corporations in law, and land which came under their control fell into dead (corporate) hands. 
Roman corporations were not real persons since they had no existence outside the power 
granted to them by the state. Nevertheless, they became legal persons on the grant of state 
power, an example of the concession theory of corporate personality. Although legal theories 
of corporate personality have varied over time, the basic idea of the corporation as a separate 
legal entity is part of English law, being made clear in the seminal case of Saloman v 
Saloman and Co Ltd in 1897,31 and continuing, despite various partial exceptions which have 
not affected the principle, until the present day. 
                                                 
28 This was often to provide heirs where there were no immediate relatives.  Incorporation of non-
relatives as heirs into a family, by adoption or even manumission, was common in Roman times.  This 
was often the only way of introducing new blood lines into restricted family genetic pools, particularly of 
patrician families, but over time, even in powerful plebeian families. 
29 Two major sources form the basis of this section of the working paper: The Catholic Encyclopedia, 
Volume IV, 1908, ‘Mortmain’. (New York: Robert Appleton Company). Nihil Obstat. Remy Lafort, 
Censor. Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York; and A. H. Oosterhoff, ‘The Law of 
Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative Review’ (1977) 27(3) The University of Toronto Law Journal 
257, 261. 
30 See: A. H. Oosterhoff, ‘The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative Review’ (1977) 27(3) 
The University of Toronto Law Journal 257, 269 which gives a detailed history of the term.  Oosterhoff 
states that one  view is that since the term was used to denote lands held by religious orders, they were 
held in ‘dead hands’ because members of religious orders who had become professed were, in 
historical times, legally regarded as dead.  Professed religious had given up their positions in the world, 
having taken their final vows of poverty and obedience to their superiors, and were regarded as having 
no civil or legal life after their profession.  More mundane derivations were also offered - that the term 
came from the custom of holding a dying person’s hand until that person was actually dead, or that the 
term had no meaning outside that given by the statutes which dealt with it. This latter meaning referred 
to the fact that when lands were lost to their feudal lords, they took with them their various attached 
rights of service to the Crown, so it was as if they were held by a dead person who could not render any 
service.  Oosterhoff regards the last meaning as the most widely accepted. 
31 [1897] A.C. 22 
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In English law, mortmain originally only referred to attempts by the state to control ownership 
of land by corporations. This was because corporate holdings were repugnant to feudalism, a 
system of land holding brought to England from France by William of Normandy. In the feudal 
system, all land was held from the King.  Grants of land (fees) were made to landholders, who 
held the land as head tenants of the King. Head tenants could make further grants to further 
tenants, establishing a chain of tenancy stretching back to the Crown.  Each respective tenant 
owed duties to his immediate lord, particularly of military service, but also of forfeiture for 
crime, of escheat (reversion to the mesne lord) in the absence of a male heir, and of disposal 
in marriage of female heirs. The feudal structure therefore relied on the holding of land by 
natural persons who could render military service, die and leave heirs, be given in marriage 
contracts, or have their land confiscated for a crime. Legal persons who were not natural 
persons, such as corporations, could not do any of these things, and so did not fit into the 
feudal system.  
 
Mortmain was extended to religious corporations, and later to charitable uses, restricting 
charities’ ability to receive gifts of land inter vivos, or by will. The control sought over religious 
houses, church charities and other church corporations originally arose because although 
Emperor Constantine32 had encouraged giving to the church, holdings of land by the church 
soon grew exponentially, and control over the lands donated or willed became concentrated 
in the hands of bishops. Even in those times monasteries, alms houses, orphanages and 
other charitable institutions of the church had special privileges such as tax relief, so that 
large holdings of church property were exempt from tax and other requirements of the law of 
the state. 
 
English medieval landholders must have made use of this legal loophole to put lands in the 
hands of religious houses, and then retake them, because the Magna Carta of Henry III 
(1225) 33 makes reference to this practice at chapter 36, forbidding the gift of land to religious 
houses, which thus avoided taxes and other levies and duties attached to the land, and then 
taking back the land at a later date, or the making of an agreement to give land to a religious 
house on condition that the land donated should be given back at a future time.  
 
The first Statute of Mortmain was passed in 1279, during the reign of Edward I.34 The statute 
provided: 
 
‘Where as of late it was provided that religious men should not enter into the fees of any 
without the will and licence of the lords in chief of whom these fees are held 
immediately; and such religious men have, notwithstanding, later entered as well into their 
own fees as into those of others, appropriated, them to themselves, and buying them, and 
sometimes receiving them from the gift of others, whereby the services which are due of 
such fees, and which at the beginning, were provided for the defence of the realm, are unduly 
withdrawn, and the lords in chief do lose their escheats of the same; we, therefore, to the 
profit of our realm, wishing to provide a fit remedy in this matter…have provided, established, 
and ordained, that no person, religious or other, whatsoever presume to buy or sell any lands 
or tenements,  or under colour of gift or lease, or of any other term or title whatever to 
receive them from any one, or in any other craft or by wile to appropriate them to himself, 
whereby such lands and tenements may come into mortmain under pain of forfeiture of 
the same. We have provided also that if any person, religious or other, do presume either by 
craft or wile to offend against this statute it shall be lawful for us and for other immediate lords 
                                                 
32 Flavius Valerius Constantinus, known as Constantine the Great (285?-337 CE) was the first emperor 
of Rome to be baptised as a Christian, an event which occurred on his deathbed. The Edict of Milan, 
which acknowledged toleration of Christianity (along with the pagan religions which still existed in the 
Roman world)  when issued in 313, also  recognised the right of the Christian church to hold property, 
and Constantine’s law of 321 allowed gifts by will to ‘the holy and venerable congregation of the Catholic 
Church’.  See: The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume IV, 1908, ‘Mortmain’. (New York: Robert Appleton 
Company). Nihil Obstat. Remy Lafort, Censor. Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York; A. 
H. Oosterhoff, ‘The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative Review’ (1977) 27(3) The 
University of Toronto Law Journal 257, 261. 
33 Various versions of Magna Carta were passed during the reign of Henry III, the son of King John.  
The religious lands loophole was referred to in Magna Carta 1217, cc36, 43; and re-enacted after 
Henry’s majority as (1225) 9 Henry III., cc32, 36. 
34 (1279) 7 Edw. I, stat.2, c.13. 
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in chief of the fee so alienated, to enter it within a year from the time of such alienation and to 
hold it in fee as an inheritance. And if the immediate lord in chief shall be negligent and be not 
willing to enter into such fee within the year, then it shall be lawful for the next mediate lord in 
chief, within the half year following, to enter that fee and to hold it, as has been said; and thus 
each mediate lord may do if the next lord be negligent in entering such fee as has been said. 
And if all such chief lords of such fee, who shall be of full age, and within the four seas and out 
of prison, shall be for one year negligent or remiss in this matter, we, straightway after the year 
is completed from the time when such purchases, gifts, or appropriations of another kind 
happen to have been made, shall take such lands and tenements into our hand, and shall 
enfief others therein by certain services to be rendered thence to us for the defence of our 
kingdom ; saving to the lords in chief of the same fees their wards, escheats and other things 
which pertain to them, and the services therefrom due and accustomed.’ (emphasis added) 
 
It is notable in this statute that even the King did not retain the lands forfeited for having been 
unlawfully removed from the possibility of service to each holder, and ultimately to the Crown, 
as this too would amount to mortmain. The King was required to pass the lands forfeited on to 
other holders who could render the services which were so valuably attached to all land 
grants. The original Latin text of this statute, known as De Viris Religiosis, (of religious 
persons) referred to the ultimate forfeit of the land to the King, as falling ‘in manu nostram’ (in 
our hands, rather than in dead hands). Even the King could not hold lands in perpetuity. 
 
The statute required the exercise of a right of entry in order to take back the land. If the right 
of entry was not exercised by the immediate lord within a year, or by the next lords within six 
months, or ultimately after a year had passed by the King, then there was an implied licence 
to hold the land in mortmain.  Title to land held in mortmain was therefore voidable only. 
 
A further statute of Edward I was passed in 129035 to allow the alienation of land from one 
freeman to another, with the incidents of land owed to the same immediate lord. However, the 
statute made clear that new holders could not hold the land in mortmain, so could not be 
religious persons (corporations sole) or groups (religious corporations).   
 
In the time of Richard II, a 1391 statute identified and closed a further loophole which had 
arisen;36 church buildings stood on ground which was hallowed (consecrated to holy and 
sacred purposes), and so beyond state control. This was not regarded as controversial.  
However, churchmen had begun to expand the land holding of each church building by taking 
adjoining land as churchyards and burial grounds, dedicating these additional lands as also 
hallowed. This extended the land holdings which were beyond state control. The statute 
required the churchmen to either immediately procure a licence in mortmain for this purpose, 
or to sell the land to another person who could render the services arising from that land.  
Licences to place or hold land in mortmain were easily available from the Crown,37 but more 
commonly used were various means of avoiding the statutes which referred to mortmain. The 
device most frequently resorted to was to give or leave land ‘to the use’ of persons while the 
title remained with someone else, thus giving rise to a whole body of trust law which survives 
to this day. The 1391 statute also extended the Statute of Mortmain 1279 to non-religious 
corporations such as guilds, fraternities and ‘mayors, bailiffs and commons of cities, boroughs 
and other towns that have a perpetual commonality’.38 This was apparently in response to the 
growing wealth of such bodies, and their consequent increase in power, which might have 
presented a threat to the Crown.39  
 
However, lands which had been placed in the hands of parochial clergy (who held as 
corporations sole), or of ecclesiastical or eleemosynary foundations (holding as corporations) 
before William’s conquest of England were not subject to the laws of mortmain, as they were 
held under the old Saxon system of tenure known as frankalmoign (an Old French term 
meaning literally ‘free alms’). This species of tenure required the holders to undertake the 
                                                 
35 The Statute Quia Emptores (1290) 18 Edw. I, c. 3. 
36 (1391) 15 Richard II, c.5. 
37 The procedures were laid out in (1299) 27 Edw. I, stat.2 and (1306) 34 Edw. I stat.3. 
38 The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume IV, 1908, ‘Mortmain’ (New York: Robert Appleton Company). Nihil 
Obstat. Remy Lafort, Censor. Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York. 
39 A. H. Oosterhoff, ‘The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative Review’ (1977) 27(3) The 
University of Toronto Law Journal 257, 269. 
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worldly duties of repairing highways, building castles, and repelling invasions, but otherwise 
required only lasting prayer for the souls of the donor and his heirs. This was still the case 
when Henry VIII confiscated the monasteries and their lands in 1535,40 so that those clergy 
and foundations holding their lands by frankalmoign were able to avoid confiscation and, 
ultimately, destruction, by acknowledging Henry as the supreme head of the Church of 
England.  In 1545, Henry extended his pursuit of the lands held in mortmain which he could 
attack by applying his confiscation statute to other religious houses and chantries (churches 
or chapels on private land which were dedicated to the singing of masses for the dead).41
 
Henry had earlier identified the holding of land in mortmain by parish churches, chapels, 
churchwardens, guilds, fraternities, commonalities, companies or brotherhoods as an 
improper perpetuity in 1531.42 The next logical step, given Henry’s leaning to Protestantism, 
was confiscation of these lands to the Crown. Apart from Henry’s desire to remarry, and the 
influence of his reading of Protestant writers, he was in need of money for the conduct of his 
wars and for various other fiscal shortfalls. The lands tied up in mortmain were a ready source 
of funds. In addition, purposes which had previously been seen as charitable, such as the 
singing of masses for the dead, and praying for the souls in Purgatory, were now seen as 
superstitious. Henry’s statutes disallowed devises of land into mortmain for such purposes for 
periods greater than 20 years. 
 
The early concept of charitable uses in English law 
 
All statutes of mortmain were suspended during the reign of Henry’s Catholic daughter Mary, 
by a statute of 1554.43 However, in Elizabeth’s time, although superstitious uses were still 
anathema, devises of land to charitable uses became again permissible.44 The list of 
charitable uses in the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth was: 
 
‘The relief of aged, impotent, and poor people;  the maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers 
and mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and scholars in universities;  the repair of 
bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches,  seabanks, and highways;  the education and 
preferment of orphans;  the relief, stock,  or maintenance of houses of correction;  marriage of 
poor maids;  supportation, aid, and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons 
decayed;  the relief or redemption of prisoners or captives;  and the aid or ease of any poor 
inhabitants concerning payment of fifteens, setting out of soldiers, and other taxes.’ 
 
However, as the list of uses was in the Preamble to the statute and not in the body of the 
statute, it was not part of statute law, but of the common law of England. Subsequent case 
law relying on the 1601 list of charitable uses has added to this body of common law. 
 
Thus, in the time of Elizabeth I, although gifts of land to charitable corporations were not 
possible per se, they were permissible if there was a licence in mortmain, or the Crown 
elected not to exercise its right of entry, so giving an implied licence in mortmain. Further, all 
devises of land to an individual in trust for a charitable use were permissible, as were all 
gifts of personalty to both charitable corporations or to individuals in trust for a charitable use. 
Charitable trusts were therefore encouraged by the Statute of Elizabeth.   
 
However, the fashion had changed again by the time of George II, when the giving of land to 
charities became identified as ‘this public mischief [which] has of late greatly increased by 
many large and improvident alienations or dispositions to uses called charitable uses’.45 The 
Mortmain Act of 1736 disallowed devises of land and interests in land to charitable uses, 
unless this had occurred more than a year before the death of the donor. Such dispositions 
were made void by the Act. The old mortmain legislation had merely rendered the title to 
donated or willed land voidable. Moreover, the Act was construed strictly by the courts, so 
                                                 
40 (1535) 27 Henry VIII, c.28.   
41 (1545) 37 Henry VIII, c. 4. 
42 (1531) 23 Henry VIII, c.10 
43 (1554) 1 and 2 Philip and Mary, c.8, section 51. 
44 (1601) 43 Eliz. I, c.4, following on from (1597) 39 Eliz I, c.6. 
45 An Act to Restrain the Disposition of Lands whereby the Same become Inalienable (1736) 9 George 
II, c.36, Preamble. This Act is commonly referred to the Mortmain Act 1736. 
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that many gifts of land, particularly in wills, were designated as being for charitable uses and 
so void. The result was an expansion in the meaning of charitable uses. 
 
The history behind this legislation is somewhat clouded, but the impetus for it resided in the 
divide between Whigs and Tories in English politics. The Whigs were the inheritors of the old 
Protestantism of the 17th century, and although not an entirely homogeneous group, were 
anti-church and anti-clerical.46 The Tories were the party of the Anglican high church, pro-
clerical, pro-philanthropy (especially church philanthropy), and even in some cases tainted by 
that horror of 17th and 18th century English politics, Popery. The passage of the Mortmain Bill 
through the Commons on April 15, 1736 was by a resounding 104 vote majority, although by 
this stage the colleges of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge had been exempted from 
the Bill. Kendrick states that the real target of the Bill was not the curtailment of mortmain, but 
rather the huge sums tied up in the clerical provision fund known as Queen Anne’s Bounty, 
which at that stage held nearly £600,000.47 This was made clear in the House of Lords 
debate on the Bill, which was passed by that House on April 20, 1736. 
 
The growth of the concept of charitable uses 
 
The Mortmain Act 1736 was so strictly construed that various means of leaving money to 
charity also were caught in its net. In Attorney General v Lord Weymouth,48 the testator left a 
devise in trust to sell all his real estate to the use of Bethlehem and St George’s Hospitals, but 
this was disallowed as a devise in mortmain since it was really a devise of the land in 
question, rather than the proceeds of sale of the land. Since a trust for sale was not a 
situation where land is alienated in perpetuity, but rather the contrary, this decision expanded 
considerably the mischief designed to be attacked by the Act. The trend of the early decisions 
was that bequests to charity would be void if the testator’s interest in the property willed fell 
within the Act’s scope of ‘lands, tenements or hereditaments, or of any estate or interest 
therein or of any charge or incumbrance affecting or to affect any lands, tenements or 
hereditaments’. The decisions found void many bequests to charity which were not interests 
in land as such, but merely income streams attached to land such as rents and profits, tithes, 
tolls, and legacies to be paid out of growing crops.49 Nor did the courts allow for the severing 
of void and non-void gifts where they were connected, such as land or buildings with 
unattached income streams to maintain them for charitable purposes. The whole bequest 
would be disallowed. 
 
The law was reviewed in 1844 by the Select Committee on Mortmain which stated that ‘the 
operation of the law is most unsatisfactory, leads to doubt, expense, uncertainty and litigation, 
and frequently defeats good and pious purposes…’50 This ultimately led to the Mortmain and 
Charitable Uses Act 1888 (UK), which although it did not actually alter the law of mortmain, 
consolidated the law, and particularly the exemptions to the law, which had been made in an 
ad hoc way since 1736. In 1888, the exemptions were for certain assurances by deed or will 
for public parks, schoolhouses, public museums, the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, 
London, Durham and Victoria and their colleges, the schools of Eton, Winchester, 
Westminster and Keble, and assurances for trustees for societies for religious purposes, and 
for the promotion of education, art, literature, science, or like purposes.51
 
The 1888 Act retained as a Preamble the listing of charitable uses from the Preamble to the 
Statute of Elizabeth, and defined land as including ‘any estate or interest in land’. The latter 
                                                 
46 Some Whigs were referred to as Church-Whigs, and were not anti-clerical, though low church, and as 
a faction, ultimately short-lived. They appear to have disbanded by the end of 1736.  See: T.F.J. 
Kendrick, ‘Sir Robert Walpole, the Old Whigs and the Bishops, 1733-1736: A Study in Eighteenth-
Century Parliamentary Politics’ (1968) 11 (3) The Historical Journal 412, 438-442. 
47 Ibid 439-440. 
48 (1743) 27 E.R. 11. 
49 A. H. Oosterhoff, ‘The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative Review’ (1977) 27(3) The 
University of Toronto Law Journal 257, 286. 
50 Report of the Select Committee appointed to inquire into the operation of the Laws of Mortmain, and 
the restrictions which limit the powers of making gifts and bequests for Charitable and Religious 
Purposes, London 1844, viii. 
51 51 and 52 Vict., c.42, Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888 (UK), Part III. 
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definition was problematic and an amending Act was passed in 189152 permitting devises of 
land to charitable uses subject to sale within one year of the testator’s death, and altering the 
definition of land to exclude the terms ‘any estate or interest in land’, devises of ‘money 
secured on land’, or ‘personal estate arising from or connected to land’. These latter changes 
overcame the long line of cases which made void bequests of money which arose from an 
interest in land. However, mortmain law continued to cause litigation and confusion until its 
repeal.53  Mortmain legislation was finally repealed in the UK in the Charities Act 1960 (UK).  
The current UK legislation is the Charities Act 2006 (UK) which defines both a charity and a 
charitable purpose for the first time in English statute law.54 However, the older common law 
is preserved in the Act. 
 
In Special Commissioners for Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] UKHL 1, Lord Macnaghten had 
stated: 
 
‘Charity in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; 
trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for 
other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads.’ 
 
This statement remained the touchstone of charitable purpose definition until the 2006 Act, 
and was interpreted accordingly in the major cases on point.55  The 2006 Act defines a 
charitable purpose as:56
 
(a) the prevention or relief of poverty;  
(b) the advancement of education;  
(c) the advancement of religion;57
(d) the advancement of health or the saving of lives;  
(e) the advancement of citizenship or community development;58
(f) the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or science;  
(g) the advancement of amateur sport;  
(h) the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or the promotion of 
religious or racial harmony or equality and diversity;  
(i) the advancement of environmental protection or improvement;  
(j) the relief of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship or 
other disadvantage;  
(k) the advancement of animal welfare;  
(l) the promotion of the efficiency of the armed forces of the Crown, or of the efficiency of the 
police, fire and rescue services or ambulance services;  
(m) any other purposes within subsection (4).59
                                                 
52 54 and 55 Vict., c. 73. 
53 For example, the confusion is still evident in the House of Lords decision of Attorney General v 
Parsons [1956] 2 W.L.R. 153.  See: A.D. Hargreaves, ‘Mortmain in Mortmain’ (1956) 19(3) The Modern 
Law Review 294, 297. See generally: Gino Dal Pont, Charity Law in Australia and New Zealand , Oxford 
University Press, 2000, chapter 1. 
54 House of Lords, Session 2005-2006, Charities Bill, Explanatory Notes, Commentary on the Clauses. 
55 Chichester Diocesan Board of Finance v Simpson [1944] UKHL 2; Williams Trustees v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [1947] UKHL 1; Gilmour v Coats [1949] UKHL 1; Baddeley (Trustees of the 
Newtown Trust) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1955] UKHL 1; Morelle Ltd v Wakeling [1955] EWCA 
Civ 1; Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society v Glasgow Corp [1967] UKHL 3; Incorporated 
Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v Attorney General [1971] EWCA Civ 13; Fraser v 
Canterbury Diocesan Board of Finance [2004] EWCA Civ 15. 
56 Charities Act 2006 (UK), section 2(2). 
57 Subsection 3 states further that in paragraph (c) “religion” includes: (i) a religion which involves belief 
in more than one god, and (ii) a religion which does not involve belief in a god.
58 Subsection 3 states that paragraph (e) includes such matters as rural or urban regeneration and the 
promotion of civic responsibility, volunteering, the voluntary sector or the effectiveness and efficiency of 
charities.  
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It is clear that charitable purposes are now very widely stated. This is partly the end result of 
the decisions based on mortmain law in the 18th and 19th centuries, which in fact were to 
restrict charitable bequests, but which had the ultimate effect of extending the list of charitable 
purposes, and partly because of changes in social mores and conditions in the latter part of 
the 20th and the early part of the 21st centuries. Moreover, the list of charitable purposes is 
now statutory, as well as a matter for the common law. This illustrates the present trend to 
encourage charitable giving and bequests as a part of public policy.  
 
Charitable purposes in Australia  
 
Charity law in Australia is in general based on the English common law described above. The 
Report on the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations 2001 stated:60
‘A survey of the use of the term `charity' in Commonwealth and State Acts confirms the 
reliance on the common law. However, there are instances where the legislation adds to or 
subtracts from the entities that would normally be caught by the common law meaning. This 
suggests that the common law meaning of charity does not suit all purposes of public policy.’ 
However, statutory definitions of charitable uses or purposes are to be found in the legislation 
of each State. For example, in Queensland the Charitable Funds Act 1958 (Qld), defines a 
charitable purpose as: 
 
‘…every purpose which in accordance with the law of England is a charitable purpose, 
and, without limiting or otherwise affecting the aforegoing, includes all or any of the following: 
(a) the supply of help, aid, relief, assistance, or support howsoever to any persons in distress 
(including, but without limiting the generality thereof, the supply of the physical wants of 
any such persons); 
(b) the education or instruction (spiritual, mental, physical, technical, or social) and the 
reformation, employment, or care of any persons; 
(c) any public purpose (whether of any of the purposes before enumerated or not) being a 
purpose in which the general interest of the community or a substantial section of the 
community (at large or in a particular locality), as opposed to the particular interest of 
individuals, is directly and vitally concerned; 
(d) the construction, carrying out, maintenance, or repair of buildings, works, and places for 
any of the purposes aforementioned; 
(e) any benevolent or philanthropic purpose (whether of the purposes before enumerated or 
not); 
(f) any analogous purpose declared either generally or in the particular case for the purposes 
of this Act by the Governor in Council by order in council published in the gazette to be a 
charitable purpose.’ (emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, the UK definitions in the 2006 Act would be relevant to Queensland law as it 
currently stands. 
 
Mortmain law has never applied in Australia. However, Queensland did originally have a 
restriction on the passage of property to charitable institutions in The Religious Educational 
and Charitable Institutions Act 1861 (Qld).61 The object of the Act was to enable incorporation 
of religious, educational and charitable institutions and to facilitate transmission of their 
property easily, safely and cheaply.62 The only restriction was that any testamentary 
disposition of property had to be attested by three witnesses and registered a month before 
                                                                                                                                            
59 Subsection 4 refers to any charitable purposes recognised by existing charity law (i.e. the existing 
common law about charities), or which are analogous to either the purposes listed in the Act or to the 
purposes recognised by existing charity law. 
60 Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations, Chapter 2, What is a 
Charity?, June 2001.   
61 This Act enabled religious, educational and charitable organisations to register under it, and to 
receive, inter alia, gifts of property which could be managed by them as perpetual corporations: see The 
Religious Educational and Charitable Institutions Act 1861 (Qld), section 1. 
62 Preamble to The Religious Educational and Charitable Institutions Act 1861 (Qld).  The preamble was 
repealed 1908. 
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the death of the testator.63 These requirements were interpreted strictly until their repeal in 
1895.64
 
Reports of the parliamentary debates of 1861 show some confusion on the part of the 
legislators of Queensland. Some clearly thought that mortmain law applied in the colonies, 
which it did not.  Some were influenced by reports of Catholic clergy attending deathbeds.65 
The Colonial Secretary of the day was reported to have said:66
 
‘Although the state of society in which Mortmain had arisen had no existence here, there were 
certain contingencies which had arisen from that state of society which still existed.’ 
 
The Attorney-General added:67
 
‘[although it was] correct…that the statute of mortmain was not in force in the colonies… No 
doubt some persons in extemis might be worked upon to pass away property by testamentary 
disposition in an unjust manner.’ 
 
After considerable debate as to whether the period of registration of the relevant dispositions 
of property should be twelve months, six months, or one month, and whether there should be 
certificates as to health and soundness of mind of the testator, and of consent of the family, 
the Bill was passed on August 9 1861 in its originally proposed form (with the requirement of 
only one month’s registration, but of three witnesses).68 The latter provision was repealed in 
1895, after vigorous debate on its necessity.69 The parliamentary debate of 23 July 1895 
showed that some members were already strongly espousing family provision, although that 
terminology was not yet in use. The Secretary for Lands was firmly opposed to family 
provision stating:70
 
‘The argument…was that, under proper safeguards, the family should be so recognised that 
property should not be diverted from them.  That was nothing more nor less than an entail by 
statute…[that] proposal was certainly socialistic.’   
 
Another member said that:71
 
‘he did not wish to prevent any man in his sound senses having the right of disposing by 
testamentary disposition of property which, according to his lights, would be a factor in 
encouraging and assisting religious or charitable institutions, but he could not agree that a man 
                                                 
63 The Religious Educational and Charitable Institutions Act 1861 (Qld), section 3.  This provision was 
repealed in 1895. 
64 In the Will of Swan (1892) 4 QLJ 171; Lascelles v McSwaine (1894) 6 QLJ 44, upheld in McSwaine v 
Lascelles [1895] A.C. 618 (Privy Council). The problems arising were not fully overcome until the 
Charitable Funds Act 1958 (Qld) was passed to deal more effectively with the meaning of charitable 
purposes, and the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) prescribed the statutory grounds for cy-près applications of 
charitable trust property.  Section 105 of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) provides the procedure for cy-près 
applications, where the charitable trust left a bequest cannot be identified, or the bequest cannot be 
carried out in whole or in part, but there is a general charitable intention on the part of a testator. The 
Religious Educational and Charitable Institutions Act 1861 was finally repealed by the Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld), though letters patent issued under it were preserved.  The repeal was by 
original section 4 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981, now renumbered section 144, which 
contains the savings provision. 
65 Even the Catholic members of the legislative assembly, in the debate, agreed that no other clergy did 
so at that time, but of course attendance at deathbeds in the Catholic tradition was for the purpose of 
the administration of the sacrament of last rites, Extreme Unction. Other members, however, denied 
religious prejudice, stating correctly that the requirements of the Act would apply to any religious 
corporation registered under the Act.  These included both the then Anglican and Presbyterian corporate 
bodies, amongst many others. 
66 The Courier (Brisbane), Friday August 9 1861, page 3.  Hansard was not in operation in 1861.  The 
Colonial Secretary was Sir Robert George Herbert. 
67 Ibid.  The Attorney-General was Mr Pring, later Mr Justice Pring. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Queensland Parliamentary Debates (1895) Volume LXXIII, 23 July 1895, 303.  The vote on the repeal 
of section 3 was carried 37 votes to 21.   
70 Ibid at 296. 
71 Ibid at 297 – the Hon. J.R. Dickson. 
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must necessarily be compelled to leave his accumulations to those whom he had brought into 
the world or who were connected with him by consanguinity.’   
 
Other members were in favour of family provision, but with reservations:72
 
‘…he thought a man should primarily look after those he had brought into the world, and that 
he had no right to leave them upon the community for support when he could provide for them, 
still they must have observed sons and others who were not worthy of the father who brought 
them here and who had no claim beyond relationship to be considered to such an extent…’ . 
 
Many were firmly in the family provision camp however: 73
 
‘…a law should be passed forbidding a man to will the whole of his property away from his 
family…He spoke with no feeling of antagonism to any religious body or charitable institution, 
but in the sincere belief that it was wise to safeguard the property of persons who might be 
subjected to undue influences of various kinds. How often had they seen instances where 
members of families had been cruelly ill-treated by testators leaving their property to found art 
galleries or to support some Little Bethel or religious institution!’   
 
Or:74
 
‘He would like to know why it should be in the power of a man to will his money to any 
institution and leave his wife and children in poverty and misery, as had been done in hundreds 
of cases…A man’s family was his natural obligation and he ought to look after their welfare. If 
the Attorney General had brought in a Bill to prevent people from giving their property to these 
religious institutions, and letting their own families go without, he would be doing more good for 
the people. The churches were well able to look after themselves.’ 
 
Thus, although not strictly on the point of the legislation before the House, family provision 
notions were already starting to take a firm hold in Queensland, five years before the passage 
of the seminal New Zealand legislation,75 and 19 years before Queensland’s own Act.76
 
TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM AND CHARITABLE BEQUESTS 
 
As the history of mortmain law shows, control over testamentary bequests was taken to the 
extreme in the early 19th century, until the Victorian era, when subscribing to charity while 
living and testamentary independence for the will-maker again encouraged philanthropy. In 
the 19th century, while freedom of testation was unlimited in England and its dominions, a 
more reasoned approach was taken in US commentary with suggestions that to consider the 
right of bequest to be without limits or ‘an almost natural right’ had ethical ramifications 
beyond what might have been an accurate statement of the common law at the time.77 The 
subsequent move between 1900 and 1938 to limit testamentary independence by family 
provision legislation in some common law jurisdictions had the undoubted effect of reducing 
some charitable bequests in wills. Of course, many argue that this sort of legislation is not an 
infringement on testamentary independence, because its original purpose was to provide 
family maintenance only, and testamentary freedom was to be otherwise retained. But the 
case law shows that the courts have gradually expanded their discretion, using the moral duty 
argument. 
 
Clearly, the impetus to philanthropy in wills has varied in each historical period, depending on 
the mood of the times. In the 21st century, should the right to make bequests to charity again 
                                                 
72 Ibid at 298 – the Hon. G Thorne 
73 Ibid at 299 – Mr Cross. 
74 Ibid at 300 – Mr Daniels. 
75 Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900 (NZ). 
76 Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1914 (Qld). 
77 M. West, ‘The Theory of Inheritance Tax’ (1893) 8 (3) Political Science Quarterly 426 at 429.  West 
gives the example of a Wisconsin statute (Laws of 1891, chapter 359) which limited the freedom of 
bequest by providing that no person leaving a widow, child or parent could bequeath more than half his 
estate to any benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, religious or missionary society. 
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be unlimited? Or should provision for family take precedence? The case of Edwards v Terry78 
is illustrative of the position in Australia.  In that case, the testatrix left 40% of her estate to the 
Salvation Army, 40% to the Royal Blind Society, 5% to the executrix and 15% to her only 
child, a son aged 56 at the time of the application.  On application for further provision, the 
son, in very necessitous circumstances, was granted 71% of the estate, which, with the 5% to 
the executrix, limited the charities to 24% of the estate instead of the original 80%.  This was 
despite the fact that the son had a troubled relationship history with his parents, including 
assaults on both, and an apprehended violence order being in place at one point.   
 
The judge did not see this as disentitling, but rather followed the two stage process described 
by the High Court in Singer v Berghouse79: first, was the applicant one permitted by the Act 
and second, was the provision provided in the will adequate? He concluded that it was not 
and ruled accordingly. Why was the son not disentitled by his violence towards his aged and 
frail parents? Why did the judge not consider the fact that the testators, husband and wife in 
turn, had deliberately limited the amount left to their son, to be more decisive? His reasoning 
included that the son’s diagnosed Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) was 
sufficient to forgive all transgressions, including his violence, and this is entirely in line with 
authority, which is clear that a poor relationship with a parent or parents does not mean that 
an applicant will not be entitled to provision.80 There are many similar cases in the reports, 
and despite many affirmations of the proposition that it is not within the courts’ power  ‘to 
recast the testator’s will or to redress inequalities or fancied injustice…’,81 the position in 
relation to such cases remains as it was expressed in the early New Zealand case of Welsh v 
Mulcock:82
 
‘No doubt the effect of the statute is to decree that a man’s will may be no more than a 
tentative disposition of his property and that the function of ultimately settling how his estate 
shall devolve must be exercised by the Court.’ 
 
In early cases on family provision, while disentitling conduct was taken more seriously by the 
courts, its effect was never regarded as fatal in all cases. As Mr Justice Edwards said in 
Plimmer v Plimmer:83
 
‘I do not think that the statute was intended to enable the Court substantially to make such a 
new will for the testator as it considers…ought to have been made. I do think that the powers 
conferred upon the Court ought to be exercised with very great caution. In the case of a widow 
the difficulties that surround the exercise of these powers are comparatively small. There are 
few persons who will not think that every testator, whatever may have been the difference 
between his wife and himself, ought to provide for his widow in a reasonable manner, unless 
she has clearly been guilty of some grave breach of the law or of conventional morality. The 
statute provides that, if she has, such matters may be brought before the Court in answer to 
her claim. In the case of adult children the case is far more difficult.  No one can ascertain, and 
it is quite incapable of proof, what circumstances may justify a parent in disinheriting his child.  
Habitual disrespect, an evident determination not to devote himself to useful pursuits but to live 
upon the proceeds of his father’s labours rather than his own, or an idle, useless life, may well 
justify a father in leaving his son wholly unprovided for by his will…Yet it could be quite 
impossible to bring such matters before the Court in a tangible shape. It is of the breath of 
family life that the family skeleton be kept in the family cupboard.’ 
 
This grappling with the particular circumstances of each case was something which gave the 
legislation, in the view of some American commentators especially, a strong ethical appeal, in 
addition to its emphasis on awards based on need.84 Since the American system is one of 
                                                 
78 [2002] NSWSC 835. For a similar case where an only son had a very poor relationship with the 
testatrix, his mother, see Wheatley v Wheatley [2006] NSWCA 262. 
79 (1994) 181 CLR 191. 
80 See John K De Groot and Bruce W Nickel, Family Provision in Australia, 3rd edition, Lexisnexis 
Butterworths, 2007, at paragraph [2.32] – [2.42]. 
81 Allardice v Allardice [1910] 29 NZLR 959, 975; affirmed [1911] A.C. 730. 
82 [1924] NZLR 673, 682. 
83 9 Gazette Law Reports 10, 21 (New Zealand). 
84J. Laufer, ‘Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom: A Report on Decedent’s Family Maintenance 
Legislation’ (1955) 69(2) Harvard L Rev 277 at 313.  This is still the view of many US commentators. 
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elective forced shares to specific family members, usually spouses, US commentators are 
almost universally impressed with the judicial discretion allowed in family provision laws, 
particularly in relation to the flexibility of applicant permitted, moral claims, and the way such 
laws can deal with changing social circumstances. 
 
The New Zealand Law Commission has taken a firm view on this very flexibility 
recommending in its 1997 report that both the size of the applicant pool and the moral claim 
basis of awards be curtailed. The Report states:85
 
‘The test of a will-maker’s “moral duty” has never been expressly approved by Parliament as a 
test for entitlement. The test assumes that there is a general acceptance of the exact content of 
a will-maker’s moral duty to adult children.  No social inquiry the Commission knows about 
supports this assumption. The test also makes a second incorrect assumption: that New 
Zealand society is culturally and ethnically homogenous…The consequences of the absence of 
any norm of this kind are that a deceased’s perception of his or her moral duty is overruled by a 
particular judge’s assessment of current social norms. This assessment is necessarily based 
on the judge’s personal sense of the fitness of things…Failure by the courts to articulate 
(beyond the obscure concept of moral duty) why precisely they are altering a will-maker’s 
arrangements results in a situation where wills are varied according to the subjective values of 
the particular judge who chances to deal with the matter. This makes it difficult to assess 
whether the court’s distribution is more commendable than the will-maker’s…’  
 
The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, on the other hand, in its review of family 
provision law in that province in 1982 argued that the moral obligation dimension was 
important, stating that ‘a broad discretion under the Wills Variation Act is essential to protect 
the integrity of the family unit by ensuring that what is really family property is not disposed of 
to strangers’.86
 
This expresses the philosophical nub of the family provision argument. Is accumulated wealth 
within a family the property of the family in perpetuity? Or should a testator have the freedom 
to alienate family wealth to charitable or other causes? Theoretically, a deceased’s wishes 
are supposed to be honoured, no matter how inappropriate or outlandish these may seem to 
be in a family’s eyes. In Grey v Harrison, the Victorian Court of Appeal said:87
 
‘It is one of the freedoms that shape our society, and an important human right, that a person 
should be free to dispose of his or her property as he or she thinks fit. Rights and freedoms 
must, of course, be exercised and enjoyed conformably with the rights and freedoms of others, 
but there is no equity, as it were, to interfere with the testator’s dispositions unless he or she 
has abused that right. To do so is to assume a power to take property from the intended object 
of the testator’s bounty and give it to someone else. In conferring the discretion in the wide 
terms found in section 91 [of the relevant Victorian Act], the legislature intended it to be 
exercised in a principled way.  A breach of moral duty is the justification for curial intervention 
and simultaneously limits its legitimate extent.’ 
Although international human rights treaties do not refer directly to the disposal of property on 
death, all refer to the family as the fundamental ‘group unit of human society’, and to the right 
to privacy in relation to one’s affairs in relation to family, home or correspondence.88 
However, succession law, which includes family provision law, is not governed by any public 
international law regime, such as those contained in human rights treaties, so the term is 
used loosely in the above quote from Grey. If there are international aspects to a particular 
will, this is a matter for private international law, and is governed by the provisions of the 
                                                                                                                                            
See for example, Ronald Chester, ‘Should American Children Be Protected Against Disinheritance?” 
(1997) 32(3) Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 405. 
85 New Zealand Law Commission, Report 39: Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment Act): 
modernising the law on sharing property on death (August 1997), ‘Introduction’ at paragraphs 33 and 
34. 
86 Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Statutory Succession Rights, WP 35, 1982, 149.  This 
is still the current view in British Columbia, especially since Tataryn v Tataryn [1994] 2 SCR 807.  
87 (1997) 2 VR 359, 366. 
88 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Articles 12 and 16(3); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Article 10; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966, Articles 17 and 23.  
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Hague Convention on the Conflicts of Laws Relating to Testamentary Dispositions89 as 
expressed in domestic laws of those countries who are parties to it, or in some countries by 
domestic laws giving a similar effect. 
Human rights treaties refer to the family as the central unit of human organisation and state 
that its interests should be actively protected and promoted.90 If this is so, it is possible to 
argue that the maintenance of family wealth within the family unit through inheritance is 
important to both the perpetuation of the family and of society itself. Total freedom of testation 
would threaten this process. It is also possible to argue more narrowly that consanguinity is 
an end in itself. This is certainly the original basis of family provision law, that consanguinity, if 
nothing else, binds the generations of a family. Obligations to the ‘call of blood’ have 
supported the moral claim notion in family provision law – a parent has a moral duty to his or 
her children, even from beyond the grave, even if their relationship while living was less than 
satisfactory. Testamentary freedom might permit this obligation to be ignored. 
 
On the other hand, human rights treaties also protect individual rights as personal rights, and 
testamentary freedom is presumably one of these personal rights.91 Testamentary freedom 
embodies the concept of ownership of property and the right to pass on property by will even 
though the testator is dead. The testator’s ownership survives his or her death, which can 
seem a bizarre notion, but is one which is crucial to dealing with property in all systems of 
political organisation which are not based on community property. Testamentary freedom is 
really about control of property by the dead person, and can also lend itself quite readily to 
control of the living by the dead person. The testator can either provide for the members of his 
or her family, or not. He or she can attach conditions to the bequests made, provided they are 
not against public policy. He or she can make commentary on any relations, exact revenge, 
and assert his or her personality in ways which may not have been possible in life. 
 
In the 19th century the individual right to testamentary freedom was expressed to be:92
 
‘The law of every civilised people concedes to the owner of property the right of determining by 
his last will, either in whole or in part, to whom the effects which he leaves behind him shall 
pass.  Yet it is clear that, though the law leaves to the owner of property absolute 
freedom in this ultimate disposal of that which he is enabled to dispose, a moral 
responsibility of no ordinary importance attaches to the exercise of the right thus 
given…The English law leaves everything to the unfettered discretion of the testator, on the 
assumption that, though in some instances, caprice or passion, or the power of new ties, or 
artful contrivance, or sinister influence, may lead to the neglect of claims that ought to be 
attended to, yet, the instincts, affections, and common sentiments of mankind may be safely 
trusted to secure, on the whole, a better disposition of the property of the dead and one more 
accurately adjusted to the requirements of each particular case, than could be obtained 
through a distribution prescribed by the stereotyped and inflexible rules of the general law…’ 
(emphasis added). 
 
The original family provision legislation in New Zealand was not meant to be other than a 
statutory adjunct to the expression of this form of testamentary freedom. A testator might 
dispose of his or her property as he or she saw fit, but not before responding to the ‘moral 
responsibility’ for proper provision for any spouse and children. Having thus ensured by 
statute that he or she had adequately followed his or her ‘instincts, affections and [the] 
common sentiments of mankind’, the testator was free to engage in whatever testamentary 
frolic he or she chose. However, as with all discretionary legislation, family provision law soon 
took on a life of its own. Judges faced with varied fact situations formulated questions such 
as: What was proper? What was adequate? What was the content of a testator’s moral 
                                                 
89 A 1961 Convention of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.  Australia is a party, 
together with 31 other nations. 
90 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Article 16(3); International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Article 10(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 
Article 23.  
91 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Article 2; Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 1966, Article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Article 2. 
92 Banks v Goodfellow (1870) 5 LR QB 549, 563-565, per Cockburn CJ. 
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responsibility? What persons were family members? What property was the estate for 
provision purposes? 
 
In the 21st century, total testamentary freedom is not found in any organised legal system, so 
the choice is really one between a discretionary system of family provision law and a system 
of forced shares, with the testator having the freedom to dispose of the residue to the benefit 
of any person or cause.  Does either system lend itself more easily to charitable bequests? 
 
It is difficult to say that the US elective forced share system itself promotes philanthropy at 
death. Many influences are at work in relation to charitable bequests in wills in the US, most 
notably the estate tax. In the US system of elective forced shares, it is clear that after the 
widow’s share is provided for, any or all children may be disinherited almost with impunity,93 
so that bequest of the residue to charity is made easier. Perhaps this accounts in part for the 
size of philanthropic testation in the US, in addition to an estate tax system which allows 
spousal and charitable exemptions of 100 percent. However, even in the US children can use 
the common law doctrines of undue influence,94 insane delusion, testamentary libel and lack 
of testamentary capacity to challenge a parent’s will.95 There is also provision for the 
preterrmitted child (a child born or adopted after a will is made, and omitted entirely from that 
will), who may be able to apply for his or her share of an estate as if the deceased had died 
intestate.96 Indeed, it could perhaps be argued that undue influence cases in the US, though 
not a common occurrence, operate in a quasi-family provision manner to support the courts’ 
view that family should be provided for before non-family, or even charities. In Carpenter v 
Horace Mann Life Insurance Co, the Arkansas Court of Appeal stated:97
 
‘Where the provisions of a will are unjust, unreasonable and unnatural, doing violence to the 
natural instinct of the heart, to the dictates of parental affection, to natural justice, to solemn 
promises, and to moral duty, such unexplained inequality is entitled to great influence in 
considering the question of testamentary capacity and undue influence.’ (emphasis added). 
 
This could be a statement from any case in family provision jurisdictions of the past 100 
years, and similar cases in the US argue for a strong cultural bias, based on moral duty, 
towards family protection when the issue is brought before the US courts.98
 
It is equally clear that bequests to charity in Australia and other family provision countries will 
always be able to be contested in the courts under the current law. It can never be said that a 
will is the final word in a discretionary system of family provision law. As the Privy Council 
expressed it in Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co:99
 
‘The task of exercising the power must always be one of great difficulty and delicacy.  It must 
always be one largely of guesswork, especially in a case like the present, which is concerned 
with children of tender age of whose needs in the future nothing can be predicted with 
certainty.’ 
 
However, their Lordships then had no difficulty at all in predicting with a great deal of certainty 
what they considered would be an appropriate amount for each child, even though the 
children were, at the time of the case, only 5 and 6 years of age. The bequest of £257,000 to 
the University of Sydney was reduced by a total of some £100,000 plus the costs of the 
                                                 
93 This does not apply to Louisiana, which, with a civil law system, has a forced share (the legitime) for 
children under 23.  However, pressure was brought to bear on Louisiana to reduce the legitime age limit 
to 23.   
94 See for example, Carpenter v Horace Mann Life Ins. Co. 730 S.W. 2d 502 (Arkansas Court of Appeal, 
1987).   
95 R. Chester, ‘Should American children be protected against disinheritance?’ (1997) 32(3) Real 
Property, Probate and Trust Journal 405 at 412.  However, these are rare events in US jurisprudence. 
96 Uniform Probate Code (US) Article II Part 3, 2-302.  In some states of the US, a child born before the 
will is made may also be covered by pretermitted child legislation. 
97 Carpenter v Horace Mann Life Ins. Co. 730 S.W. 2d 502 at 507.  See, for greater detail of undue 
influence cases in the US: M. B. Leslie, ‘The Myth of Testamentary Freedom’ (1996) 38 Ariz. L Rev 235 
at 290. 
98 M. B. Leslie, ‘The Myth of Testamentary Freedom’ (1996) 38 Ariz. L Rev 235 at 268. 
99 [1938] A.C. 463 at 483 per Lord Romer. 
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action. This sort of decision is commonplace in family provision law, and to some appears ripe 
for law reform. 
 
LAW REFORM PROPOSALS 
 
Discussion has been ongoing on the need for a uniform approach to family provision 
legislation in Australia. The Queensland Law Reform Commission has been coordinating a 
joint project with the Standing Committee of Attorneys General to investigate uniform 
succession laws for some time. The project is divided into four stages, of which one is family 
provision. The papers so far produced on family provision have been: 
 
• Issues Paper W47: The Law of Family Provision (1995); also published by the  Law 
Reform Commission of NSW as Issues Paper 11 (February 1996); 
• The National Committee’s Final Report to the Standing Committee on Family 
Provision (No. 28, December 1997); and 
• Supplementary Report on Family Provision, (No. 58, July 2004); also published by 
the Law Reform Commission of NSW as Report 110 (May 2005), including a model 
Family Provision Bill. 
 
The relevant question arising from these reports for our purposes is whether any restriction of 
the pool of applicants in family provision cases will assist charities in retaining bequests made 
to them in wills.  In the 1997 report, the National Committee recommended the curtailment of 
family provision in the uniform laws in that the only appropriate applicants would be a 
husband, a wife, a non-adult child,100 and a person for whom the deceased person had a 
responsibility to make a provision (as defined in the Victorian Administration and Probate Act 
1958). De facto spouses were not included. However, in the supplementary report of 2004, de 
facto spouses were included,101 and this was reflected in the Family Provision Bill 2004 which 
accompanied the report. Clause 6(1) of the Bill lists: 
 
• the wife or husband of the deceased person at the time of the deceased’s death, 
• a person who was, at the time of the deceased person’s death, the de facto partner of 
the deceased person, 
• a non-adult child of the deceased person. 
 
Clause 7(1) further provides that a person to whom the deceased owed a responsibility to 
provide maintenance, education or advancement in life may apply for provision. 
 
The recommended approach therefore combines a status criterion and a circumstances 
criterion for application.102 The status of the applicant as wife, husband, de facto partner or 
minor child will be considered, or, if persons other than those listed in clause 6(1) apply, a 
circumstances approach based on whether the deceased had responsibility to make provision 
for the applicant will be used. Adult children would clearly fall into the ‘circumstances’ 
category in this regime, presumably based on dependency. The issue of whether same sex 
partners should be included in either the clause 6(1) category, the clause 7(1) category has 
been left for each separate jurisdiction to decide.   
 
Clause 6(2) defines a ‘non-adult child’ as a child of the deceased person who was a minor 
when the deceased person died, or who was born after the deceased person died,103 but 
does not include a step-child of the deceased person in the definition. The time limit for 
applications is not later than 12 months after the deceased’s death: clause 9(1). Clause 10(1) 
is the operative provision allowing the court to make an order for provision if the person is an 
appropriate applicant, and the will has not made adequate provision for the proper 
                                                 
100 This meant a child less than 18 years of age. 
101 Supplementary Report on Family Provision, (No. 58, July 2004) paragraph 2.92.10. 
102 Rosalind F. Croucher, ‘Towards Uniform Succession Laws in Australia’ Keynote address to the 
National Council of the Trustee Corporations of Australia, 18 April 2007. 
103 This refers to what is currently called in some jurisdictions a child en ventre sa mere, the traditional 
legal term for an unborn child. 
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maintenance, education or advancement in life of that person. The numerous matters to be 
taken into account by the court are listed in clause 11(2). 
 
The model Family Provision Bill 2004 does not really address the issue of whether restriction 
of the pool of applicants will assist charities in pursuing bequests. It merely provides that any 
moneys held by the administrator of the estate for charity are not to be regarded as 
distributed to the charity until they are fully vested in that charity. Thus, any administrator 
faced with a family provision claim could not distribute the charitable bequest until the 
application for family provision has been heard.104 This does not change the current position.  
Moreover, if the moneys have been distributed, they can be reclaimed after a successful 
family provision application declares them to be notional estate.105 This extends the current 
position, because at present only New South Wales allows this option.106
 
While any proposed restriction in the pool of applicants may assist charities to retain 
bequests, the National Committee has also recommended that the concept of ‘notional estate’ 
in the New South Wales legislation be adopted nationally. In particular, the recommendations 
promote the necessity of severing joint tenancies before death in appropriate situations,107 
and the clarification of the situation when the recipient of provision subsequently dies and 
passes the provision assets on to third parties.108  This may have a detrimental effect on the 
retention of bequests in wills by charities, as New South Wales case law shows. It should be 
noted, however, that agreement on the inclusion of notional estate is far from unanimous 
across the various state law societies. For example, the Queensland Law Society believes 
that notional estate provisions are not a necessary reform,109 given the decision in 
Bridgewater v Leahy.110  However, New South Wales has now adopted the model provisions 
(except as to permitted applicants) as Chapter 3 of the amended Succession Act 2006 (NSW) 
– see the Succession Amendment (Family Provision) Bill 2008, introduced into the New South 
Wales parliament on 26 June 2008.  The Bill was passed by the Legislative Council on 24 
September 2008 and was sent to the Legislative Assembly for concurrence on the same day. 
The Bill repeals the former Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW), and may give impetus to the 
adoption of the model provisions, or some of them, in other states. 
 
At the same time as the Australian review has been taking place, the New Zealand Law 
Commission has reviewed the family provision legislation in that country and has 
recommended that adult children should not be appropriate applicants on the basis that such 
children are seldom in need and that a moral basis for provision for adult applicants over 19 is 
absurd, and a mere gloss on the legislation unsupported by the parliament.111 No legislative 
action has been taken on any of the recommendations made in New Zealand to date.   
 
In Canada, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC) produced a uniform Dependants’ 
Relief Act in 1974 which was enacted by Ontario, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Prince Edward 
Island, North West Territory and Yukon Territory, and adopted in similar form in the Code Civil 
du Quebec. Apart from Manitoba, which was the last province to adopt the uniform Act in 
1990, the other Canadian jurisdictions which enacted the uniform legislation have renamed, 
reviewed, or adapted it since it was first implemented.  Although the uniform Dependants’ 
Relief Act remains as a recommendation of the ULCC, no further adoptions have occurred 
since 1990. In addition, British Columbia has produced the Report on Statutory Succession 
Rights, from which there have been no resulting alterations to the law,112 and Manitoba the 
                                                 
104 Model Family Provision Bill 2004, clause 14(4). 
105 Model Family Provision Bill 2004, clause 14(5).  See sections 79 and 81 of the Succession Act 2006 
(NSW). 
106 See also section 76(2)(b) of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW). 
107 Clause 27(2)(b).  See also section 76(2)(b) of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW). 
108 Clause 27(2)(a). See also section 82 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW). 
109 John de Groot, Family Provision Claims and the Family Law Intersection, STEP seminar, Brisbane, 
28 July 2008. 
110(1998) 194 CLR 457, where property disposed of inter vivos was held to be subject to claims in equity 
under the doctrine of undue influence and of unconscionable bargains. 
111 New Zealand Law Commission, Report 39: Succession Law - A Succession (Adjustment) Act: 
modernising the law on sharing property on death (August 1997).    
112 British Columbia Law Institute WP 35, December 1983.   
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Report on Wills and Succession Legislation which recommended some very minor alterations 
to the law of family provision.113 As only Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and 
Saskatchewan have law reform commissions in Canada, any strong impetus to reform family 
provision law has not been observable beyond academic writings.114
 
However, most of the Canadian provinces already do not allow applications for family 
provision from adult children, unless disabled in some way,115 or from step-children,116 and 
some restrict applications from de facto117 and same sex partners.118 Nevertheless, this type 
of restriction in family provision laws could be difficult to implement in Canada because of the 
operation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, especially article 15(1),119 and it 
seems that the interaction of family provision law and the non-discrimination provision of the 
Charter has not been fully worked through to date. 
 
It appears that proposals for law reform in family provision jurisdictions will not necessarily 
benefit charities. Therefore, charities should take an active interest in the proposals to ensure 
their interests are considered, given the continuing case law trend against their success in 
retaining bequests across all jurisdictions.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is difficult to understand why, in 2008, an adult of full capacity and understanding cannot 
choose to leave the entirety of his or her estate to a charity of his or her choosing, after 
having provided for any surviving spouse (including a de facto or same sex partner of more 
than 2 years standing) and dependent children (defined as those under (say) 21, or even 25). 
In Australia, neither the model bill nor the New South Wales legislative amendments of 2008 
represent major law reform. If inheritance law was to be completely reviewed, then it is 
possible that more testamentary freedom would be appropriate in the circumstances of the 
21st century, especially in the context of a continuing comprehensive social security system. 
 
Major law reform could involve a system of fixed shares for spouses and dependent children, 
and freedom for the remainder, or testamentary freedom with a family provision requirement 
for spouses and dependent children only. While some might argue that this casts the burden 
of caring for hapless relatives onto the social security system, and therefore taxpayers 
generally, it can equally be argued that increased bequest income would relieve the social 
security and charitable subsidy systems of at least the same amount, and with less 
uncertainty attached.  
 
In the absence of more profound law reform proposals on inheritance law generally, it would 
seem advisable that charities should support the current uniform family provision law 
                                                 
113 Manitoba Law Reform Commission Report 108, March 2003.  
114 G. Bale, ‘Palm Tree Justice and Testator's Family Maintenance - The Continuing Saga of Confusion 
and Uncertainty in the B.C. Courts’ (1987) 26 E.T.R. 295; D.C. Simmonds, ‘Succession Law Reform in 
Ontario: An Old Cat Needs a New Kick’ (1991) 10 Estates Journal 297; L. Amighetti, The law of 
dependants' relief in British Columbia, Carswell Legal Publications, 1991; Ronald Chester, 
‘Disinheritance and the American Child: an alternative from British Columbia (1998) 1 Utah Law Review 
1; Cameron Harvey and Linda Vincent, The Law of Dependant’s Relief in Canada , Carswell Legal 
Publications, 2nd edition, 2006; Sheila Nemet-Brown, Canada Quantum Digest – Spousal Support and 
Dependant’s Relief, International Press Publication, 2007. 
115 Saskatchewan is alone in having a ‘needs’ category for children over 18, while British Columbia, 
Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador,  and Ontario do not specify an age for the definition of ‘child’.  
Five provinces specify a ‘child under 18’, although Yukon has a ‘child under 16’, and the North West 
Territories and Nunavut have a ‘child under 19’. 
116 Ontario, Manitoba, the North West Territories and Nunavut have categories of ‘dependant’ which 
could include a step-child, though this is not made explicit. 
117 Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador.  This can also depend on the definitions used.  For 
example, in Alberta, the definition that could include a de facto is that of ‘adult interdependent partner’, 
but not all de facto spouses will fit this description.    
118 Same sex partners are excluded in all provinces except Prince Edward Island.   
119 Article 15 (1) states: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination 
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
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proposals, and lobby for the model bill to be adopted, minus the notional estate provisions 
which do not generally assist charities in pursuing bequests. This would provide a limited 
applicant pool, and be a move towards testamentary freedom to leave a charitable bequest in 
a will. 
 
 
FURTHER RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
Further research is required to explore the dynamics of the decision making process of 
charities facing a family provision application, the drivers behind the apparent increase in 
family provision applications, and public attitudes to charities in this context. In this paper only 
reported cases involving bequests to charity have been reviewed but the vast majority of 
cases are settled through negotiation or mediation well before court proceedings. An 
understanding of the issues in unreported cases may additionally assist in the law reform 
process and give all concerned an insight into the themes underlying, and drivers behind, 
family provisions claims. The usefulness of charities being represented in mediations and 
court cases needs also to be considered. 
 
These issues will be pursued through semi-structured interviews with those who play a part in 
contesting and/or settling family provisions claims. It is intended to interview eastern seaboard 
specialist estate lawyers in private practice and trust companies who have a recognised 
practice with advising clients about such matters. This will include those who specialise in 
wills and estate law and also litigation lawyers who often appear for family claimants. 
Specialist mediators who regularly mediate family provision claims will also be interviewed. In 
addition, representatives of charities with active bequest programs will be interviewed about 
their views on such claims and experiences. 
APPENDIX A 
 
Selected cases on family provision in Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions which have involved charities: 
 
CASE NAME YEAR COURT  STATE CLAIMANT CHARITY/IES 
INVOLVED 
OUTCOME 
Royal North Shore Hospital v 
Crichton-Smith 
1938 High Court NSW Widow Six charities in all The widow was not entitled to maintenance expressed in the 
will since she already had such maintenance because of a 
deed of separation.  The charities received her share. 
Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co  1938 Privy Council NSW Two minor sons left 
legacies of £15,000 
each 
Remainder of estate of 
£257,000 left to the 
University of Sydney 
Legacies to sons increased from £15,000 each to £25,000 
each; residue to the university after costs. 
Dehnert v Perpetual Executors 
and Trustees Association of 
Australia Ltd 
1954 High Court VIC Adopted daughter Charities not named The adopted daughter had the will varied in her favour to 
three times the original legacy. 
Thomas v Perpetual Trustee Co 
Ltd 
1955 High Court NSW Daughter and 
granddaughter 
Eight charities in all After expiry of a trust, proceeds of will declared to be under 
intestacy.  Daughter and granddaughter appropriate 
beneficiaries as against charities. 
Pontifical Society for the 
Propagation of the Faith v Scales 
1962 High Court QLD Widow and adult 
son 
Ten charities in all At first instance, widow provided with the income from 
£20,000, and adult son with £3000 and £10000 on the death 
of his mother; adult son’s provision denied in toto on appeal. 
Hughes v National Trustees 
Executors and Agency Company 
of Australasia Ltd  
1979 High Court VIC Only son of a 
testatrix who left 
entire estate to 
charity 
Bethlehem Home for the 
Aged, Bendigo 
Entire estate awarded to son despite some evidence of bad 
relations between the testatrix and the son. 
Green v Perpetual Trustee Co 
Limited 
1985 NSWSC NSW Son, in prison, 
claiming as against 
two charities 
Two charities named in 
will 
Son was awarded $3000 after six months out of prison, and 
a further $3000 after twelve months out of prison. A sum of 
$65,000 was set aside in trust to buy a house or to be 
invested in a house by the trustee.  This sum was to revert 
to the charities in equal shares if the son could not stay out 
of jail for 10 clear years. 
Maybury v Public Trustee 1986 NSWSC NSW Step daughter of 
testator 
Seven charities left 2/3 
of a $1 million estate 
Will varied to leave step daughter a home unit worth 
$110,000 and $40,000 cash. 
Hoadley v Hoadley 1988 NSWSC NSW Son of testator left 
no provision; 
daughter claiming 
increased provision 
Heart Foundation of 
Australia; Sydney 
Hospital Foundation for 
Research 
Daughter awarded increased provision to $80,000; son 
awarded $65,000 with the proviso that if he had not ten clear 
years out of prison by 28 February 2007, the $65,000 was to 
go to the charities equally. 
Anasson v Phillips; Pompeus v 
Phillips 
1988 NSWSC NSW The only daughter 
and grandchildren 
of testatrix 
Microsearch Foundation 
left about $2.5 million of 
a $3 million estate 
Legacy to the Foundation reduced to $750,000. 
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CASE NAME YEAR COURT  STATE CLAIMANT CHARITY/IES OUTCOME 
INVOLVED 
Quek v Bulllock; Quek v Beggs 1990 NSWSC NSW Two children of 
testatrix left without 
provision; claim to 
notional estate 
South Granville Baptist 
Church 
Notional estate found.  Two real estate properties and the 
proceeds of another donated inter vivos declared to be the 
estate, totalling about $450,000, to be divided equally. 
Re Gardner 1994 QSC QLD Only adult daughter 
of testatrix 
Testatrix left entire 
estate to Amnesty 
International (Qld) and 
the Sisters of Charity 
Daughter awarded $100,00 out of a net estate of about 
$220,000. 
Public Trustee v Rosa Alvaro 1995 SASC SA Widow and children 
of deceased 
testator 
Anti-Cancer Foundation 
of the 
Universities of South 
Australia; the Asthma 
Foundation of South 
Australian Inc 
The will making the bequests to the charities involved was 
set aside as invalid because of the deceased’s mental state 
at the time of the making of the will.  An earlier will leaving 
the deceased’s estate to his wife and children was to be 
reinstated. 
Byrne v Galland 1995 NSWSC NSW Adult daughter of 
testator  
Testator left entire estate 
in equal shares to the 
Royal NSW Institute for 
Deaf and Blind Children 
and the Challenge 
Foundation 
Adult daughter awarded $90,000 from a total estate of about 
$99,000. 
Grant v Public Trustee 1996 NSWSC NSW Adult daughter and 
son 
Whole estate of 
$690,000 left to charity 
Daughter awarded $50,000 and son awarded $75,000. 
Shearer v Public Trustee; Hawke v 
Public Trustee 
1998 NSWSC NSW Two daughters and 
one son (all adults) 
left no provision at 
all in their mother’s 
will 
National Heart 
Foundation of Australia 
and the Australian 
Kidney Foundation in 
equal shares 
The will was not varied. 
Brokenshire v The Equity Trustees 
Executors Agency Company Ltd 
1998 VSC VIC Nephew omitted 
from  will which he 
challenged as made 
under undue 
influence 
Eaglehawk Uniting 
Church 
Nephew unsuccessful. 
Kent-Biggs v ANZ Executors 
Trustee Company Ltd 
1999 NSWSC NSW Adopted daughter 
claiming from step-
mother’s estate 
University of Sydney Will varied to award $100,000 for adopted daughter, leaving 
about $1.1 million (after costs and commission) for the 
University of Sydney. 
Re Wright 1999 QSC QLD Only adult daughter 
of deceased left 
$50,000 
Remainder of total estate 
of $675,000 left to a 
single charity 
Will varied to provide $225,000 for the adult daughter.  
Remainder to charity. 
Mitrovic v Perpetual Trustee Co 
Ltd 
1999 NSWSC NSW Adult niece of 
testatrix left $5000 
Remainder of estate left 
to charity 
Will varied to award adult niece $125,000. 
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Richard v AXA Trustees Ltd 2000 VSC VIC Adult daughter with 
a psychiatric illness 
left in the hands of 
the trustees with 
discretion as to the 
disbursement of 
both income and 
capital 
Entire residual estate left 
to a charitable trust for 
the benefit of the 
Brotherhood of 
St Laurence, the Royal 
Victorian Institute for the 
Blind and the Salvation 
Army. 
Will varied to award daughter $650,000 of which not more 
than $550,000 was to be used to purchase a house, and the 
remainder to be invested. 
Schultz v Goldsmith 2000 NSWSC NSW Adopted son left 
25% of the estate 
Salvation Army, Eastern 
Territory (25%), the 
Lutheran Concordia 
College of Adelaide 
(25%), and the Smith 
Family organisation of 
Griffith (25%) 
Adopted son awarded 50% of the estate, with the remaining 
50% to be divided equally among the three charities. 
Wolnizer v Pubic Trustee 2001 NSWSC NSW Only surviving son 
(an undischarged 
bankrupt) who 
received one third 
of the estate in the 
will, but requested a 
larger share 
WIRES (NSW) (1/12) 
and the Bobby 
Goldsmith Foundation 
(3/12) 
The will was varied in the son’s favour to reduce the legacy 
to the Bobby Goldsmith Foundation by 1/12.  All other 
bequests were unvaried. 
Marshall v Redford 2001 NSWSC NSW Children of testator 
whose whole estate 
was left to charity 
RSPCA (NSW)  One son compromised for $91,500, leaving a net estate of 
$255,453.  The will was then varied to award $40,000 to the 
daughter, and $75,000 to the other son.  The remainder 
went to the RSPCA. 
Hogan v Clarke 2002 NSWSC NSW Estranged daughter Children’s Hospital 
Westmead (by 
succession) 
Plaintiff’s claim denied; bequests to charity contained in will 
retained 
Lee v Hearn 2002 VSC VIC Non-relative, 
sometime carer, 
claiming a moral 
duty owed to him 
The whole estate (except 
for some specific 
legacies) was  
bequeathed a charitable 
trust 
The claimant’s right to provision was refused. 
Blundell v Curvers 2002 NSWSC NSW Husband claiming 
an interest in 
substantial artworks 
collection left solely 
to charity 
Various charities 
(unnamed) 
Artworks ordered to be sold and husband granted half-
interest in proceeds of sale of artworks. 
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Pata v Vumbuca 2002 NSWSC NSW Nephew Challenge Foundation, 
the Deaf & Dumb 
Society of New South 
Wales and the New 
South Wales Institution 
for Deaf & Blind Children 
(in equal shares) 
Legacy to the nephew of $70,000, a life estate in a home 
worth $450,000 and a capital sum of $240,000 for repairs to 
the property.  The charities to retain the residual rights to the 
property after the nephew’s death (i.e. their legacy to be 
reduced from approx $350,000 each, and the remainder 
deferred).  
Edwards v Terry 2002 NSWSC NSW Only son claiming 
an increase in the 
15% of his mother’s 
estate left to him 
Royal Bind Society and 
the Salvation Army 
originally left 40% each 
of the estate (the 
executor was left 5% 
which was not disputed) 
Son successful in claiming almost 71% of the remaining 
estate, the executrix retaining 5%.  The remaining estate 
(24%) was split equally between the charities. 
Novak-Niemela v Perpetual 
Trustee Co Ltd 
2002 NSWSC NSW Widow and adult 
son 
Apart from small 
bequests to the widow 
and son, the entire 
estate was tied up in a 
trust until 2080 which 
could pay at its 
discretion the widow, 
son, grandchildren, and 
the Salvation Army 
Property Trust. After 
2080 the trust assets 
were to be paid 60% to 
the Salvation Army and 
40% to the testator’s 
grandchildren, or (as 
substitute) great-
grandchildren. 
The widow was awarded the testator’s interest in a home 
unit, and $100,000 and the son was awarded a bequest of 
$408,000 out of the total estate of about $1.5 million (after 
costs).  
The Auckland City Mission v 
Brown 
2002 NZCA NZ Adult daughter 
claiming increased 
provision 
Auckland City Mission 
and the Salvation Army 
(both these charities 
were left the residue), 
and the Cancer Society 
(left a specific bequest of 
$500,000).  The 
deceased’s will left some 
$3 million to charity,  
This was an appeal from the High Court of New Zealand 
which had increased the adult daughter’s provision to $1.6 
million.  This appeal reduced that to just over $850,000 
(about 20% of the estate) to be paid from the residue of the 
estate.  This case has now been distinguished decisively as 
turning very particularly on its facts in both Henry v Henry 
[2007] NZCA 42 and Montgomerie v Public Trust [2007] 
NZHC 804.  These latter cases restore the status quo as 
regards applications by adult children in New Zealand. 
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INVOLVED 
Mahon v The Perpetual Trustee 2004 NSWSC NSW Adult daughter 
claiming home unit 
and lump sum from 
father’s estate  
Mackillop Family 
Services Ltd as trustee 
for the St Vincent de 
Paul Boys Orphanage, 
Melbourne 
Adult daughter awarded home unit and lump sum of 
$40,000 effectively halving the legacy to the orphanage. 
Perry v Olliffe 2004 NSWSC NSW Adult daughter 
(other sibling made 
no claim) left 
income on half the 
estate for 20 years 
(which had expired)  
with 80% of the 
residual estate to go 
to charities 
New South Wales 
Cancer Council and 
Salvation Army NSW 
Property Trust 
Each daughter granted 37.5% of the capitalised estate, and 
the two charities 9.5% each (two grandchildren of the 
deceased received 3% each). 
Carstrom v Boesen 2004 NSWSC NSW Claimant in position 
of daughter (though 
possibly not 
biological daughter) 
left $75,000 of 
$300,000 total 
estate; each charity 
received $47, 000 
Salvation Army, the St 
Vincent de Paul Society, 
the Uniting Church In 
Australia Property Trust, 
the Smith Family 
Claimant awarded $150,000 of the $300,000 estate, the 
amount to be taken from each charity’s provision. 
Phillips v Hunt 2005 NSWSC NSW Widow left only a 
life interest in the 
matrimonial home, 
but application for 
family provision 
made out of time 
Trustees of the Sisters of 
Mercy (North Sydney) for 
the purposes of Our 
Lady’s Home at Waitara; 
St Gabriel’s School for 
Deaf Boys at Castle Hill 
conducted by the 
Christian Brothers; 
Trustees of the Sisters of 
Charity for the purposes 
of the Sacred Heart 
Hospice at Darlinghurst. 
The time for application being extended, the court ordered 
that the will be varied so that the home could be sold and 
the proceeds paid to the widow to the extent of 70%; 30% to 
be paid to the three named charities.  
Hunt v Delaney 2005 NSWSC NSW Two of three 
siblings abandoned 
by their deceased 
mother as children, 
and left no provision 
in her will 
St Vincent de Paul 
Society and the Royal 
Blind Society in equal 
shares 
$150,000 to the son and $200,000 to the daughter out of a 
total estate of around $430,000. 
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Morton v Little; Price v Little 2005 NSWSC NSW Adult daughters left 
legacies of $20,000 
each 
Foundation for the 
National Parks and 
Wildlife due to receive 
over $1 million 
One adult daughter awarded $350,000 and the other 
$100,000, reducing the charitable bequest to around 
$590,000.  
Powell v Monteath 2006  QSC QLD Stepson with no 
provision in 
stepmother’s will 
Queensland Cancer 
Fund and National Heart 
Foundation of Australia 
(Qld) 
Stepson awarded a lump son of $40,000 out of a total estate 
of approximately $235,000. 
Groser v Equity Trustees 2007 VSC VIC Widow left a life 
interest in home 
The estate (except for 
specific legacies to 
children and 
grandchildren) was 
bequeathed to various 
charitable trusts 
The court ordered that the home be sold to provide for the 
continuing care of the widow in a nursing home or hostel 
(similar to Phillips v Hunt). 
Nelligan v Crouch 2007 NSWSC NSW Same sex partner, 
though the 
relationship had 
ceased before the 
death of the testator 
Whole estate left to 
Royal Flying Doctor 
Service (RFDS), after gift 
to Crouch as executor 
failed 
Partner awarded a legacy of $100,000, effectively reducing 
the legacy to the RFDS by about two-thirds. 
Trustees for the Salvation Army 
Property Trust v Becker 
2007 NSWCA NSW Friend of testatrix 
left almost the entire 
estate by second 
will in contention, 
with small legacies 
to the charities 
Testatrix left entire 
estate to the Salvation 
Army and the Royal 
Flying Doctor Service in 
equal shares under first 
will in contention 
Second will declared valid; charities deprived of all but small 
legacies and had to bear the burden of costs.  An 
application for leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia 
was rejected by that Court with costs against the charities. 
Ansett v Moss 2007 VSCA VIC Second son of 
testator denied 
relief at first 
instance. 
Testator, after providing 
for wife and children, left 
the bulk of his estate to a 
charitable trust. 
On appeal, the court said that ‘arguable that a wise, just and 
wealthy testator had a duty to make better provision for 
vicissitudes facing a son currently without financial means.’ 
Therefore, appellant's prospects of success ‘not necessarily 
negligible’ on further application. 
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Abrego v Simpson 2008 NSWSC NSW Husband of a 
marriage of short 
duration left only the 
contents of his 
wife’s home, 
provided he collect 
them within three 
months of her 
death. In her will, 
she accused him of 
physical and 
emotional abuse. 
After pecuniary legacies, 
she gave the residue of 
her estate as follows: 
1/17th to the Foundation 
Fighting Blindness, 
1/17th to Diabetes 
Australia (NSW), 1/17th 
to the Cancer Council of 
New South Wales, 
7/17ths to St Gabriel’s 
Church at Bexley for the 
charitable purposes of 
that church and the 
remaining 7/17ths to St 
Patrick’s Catholic Church 
in Sydney for the 
charitable purposes of 
that church. 
The husband was awarded a life interest in the matrimonial 
home and a pecuniary legacy of $50,000.   The other 
pecuniary legacies were not interfered with.  Therefore the 
substantial costs were borne by the residue, reducing the 
amount to be distributed to the charities by more than 
$120,000.   
Jacques v Public Trustee of 
Queensland 
2008 QSC Qld Daughter left a 
house and $30,000 
plus the income of a 
trust of the residue 
set up by the 
deceased for her 
daughter’s 
maintenance and 
support during her 
lifetime. The 
remainder of the 
trust after the 
daughter’s death 
left on trust to the 
two named charities 
Queensland Cancer 
Fund and the Australian 
Neurological Foundation 
(Queensland Bequest 
Fund) 
The daughter made application for a change in the trust 
arrangements so that the bulk of the capital should be paid 
into her superannuation fund.  This would have deprived the 
charities of the bulk of the capital in the remainder.  The 
judge declined to interfere with the trustee’s investment 
arrangements, thus preserving the position of the charities. 
The charities were not represented in the action. 
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Groser v Equity Trustees Ltd 2008 VSC VIC Trustees, seeking to 
determine whether 
prior order 
concerning Mrs 
Groser could be 
carried out given 
her death (see 
Groser v Equity 
Trustees Ltd [2007]  
above, and 
Attorney-General 
(Vic) seeking to 
protect the interests 
of the charities 
under the trust 
established by Mr 
Groser 
Charitable trust set up 
under Mr Groser’s will 
Order concerning Mrs Groser could not be carried out, given 
her intervening death.  Charitable interests protected.  All 
costs borne by estate. 
Townsend v Nichols 2008 NSWSC NSW Sister of deceased 
claiming to be 
dependant 
A one sixth part of the 
estate was left to each of 
The Australian Cancer 
Foundation for Medical 
Research; The 
Australian Quadriplegic 
Association Limited; The 
Salvation Army; and The 
Paraplegic and 
Quadriplegic Association 
of New South Wales 
 
The sister was successful in her claim, and was awarded 
$200,000 taken from the charities’ shares of the estate.  
Costs were also payable from the estate. 
 
The charities did not appear or give evidence at the hearing. 
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